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iPreface
This report represents the master thesis that is part of the mandatory subject Production and
quality engineering - master thesis (TPK4900). The work with the thesis has been carried out
during the 10th semester, spring of 2012, partly in Trondheim at the department of Production
and Quality Engineering (IPK) at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU),
and partly at Aker Solutions headquarters at Fornebu.
The Master Thesis is performed in cooperation with Aker Subsea AS (business area within
Aker Solutions), which has helped to define the thesis as well as shared information and knowl-
edge. Due to confidential material, certain details are left out or anonymized.
The intended readers should have a basic knowledge of system reliability theory, as well as
the terminology behind reliability, availability, maintainability and safety. A more detailed de-
scription of the abbreviations used, is presented in appendix A.
Trondheim, 2012-06-11
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Summary and Conclusions
Development of new technology has always been an important activity for the oil and gas in-
dustry. New technologies can streamline the production, improve the recovery rate and provide
economic benefits. The implementation cost may sometimes be high, but the end result may in
total easily turn out to have great economical advantages.
The challenge is that new technology may involve potential threats with high uncertainty.
These factors must be managed prior to implementation, and is achieved through technology
qualification. The aim of technology qualification, is to provide sufficient evidence that the
technology is fit for purpose without high risk.
In order to increase the understanding about qualification, the thesis introduces key terms,
which are further discussed and compared. These are the qualification, verification and valida-
tion. In addition, different qualification methods are introduced and discussed. The methods
describe how the qualification certificate shall be produced, through physical testing, analytical
evaluation or integrated qualification.
An in-depth literature survey revealed relevant standards, recommendations and other guid-
ance documents. General qualification documents provide guidance of how general qualifica-
tion should be executed. Business-specific documents illustrate how the general documents are
implemented into the business-specific procedures, as well as providing internal guidance. In
addition, guidance for qualification of safety instrumented systems, and supplementary quali-
fication documents are presented.
In the general qualification document, DNV-RP-A203, a qualification program for the new
technology is introduced. This qualification program is a the framework of how a technology
qualification process will be implemented. The process deals with a structured set of steps,
which are intended to provide qualification evidence and to ensure that qualification require-
ments are met. These steps are: technology qualification basis, technology assessment, threat
assessment, technology qualification plan, execution of the plan, and performance assessment.
Development of new technologies is usually performed by a technology provider on behalf
of an oil operator. In such cases, several qualification procedures are involved. This master the-
sis discusses how and to what extent the different documents should be followed. In addition,
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challenges in projects where several parties are involved are discussed, more specific between
Aker Solutions and Statoil.
In the last part of the thesis, a extensive qualification case study is documented based on
the technology qualification process provided in DNV-RP-A203. A passive subsea inlet cooler
unit is selected as case equipment. Such subsea technology are adopted from existing topside
solutions, but modified to withstand other hostile operational and environmental conditions.
Qualification requirements for the inlet cooler unit are identified in the technology qualification
basis. The maturity of the unit is defined in the technology assessment, and critical failures
found in the threat assessment. A qualification plan is developed with four different activities
intended to reduce the critical failures. The plan is executed, and the performance assessment
considers to what extent the qualification requirements are met. Due to insufficient material,
the last process step is inadequately reached.
In addition, an extension of the case study is carried out in terms of a production assur-
ance analysis. The analysis is conducted using MIRIAM Regina, where a model is modulated
with respect to failure modes identified in the threat assessment. Each failure mode is assigned
different parameters, like failure rates and restoration time. The model is validated by compe-
tent staff at Aker Solutions. The simulation is carrier out with a 25-years perspective, through
1000 replications. The simulated results show that the average technical availability for the inlet
cooler unit is 98,93%. Since no availability requirement is stated for the inlet cooler unit, the
thesis does not draw any qualification conclusions. However, it indicates that, if this simulated
value is higher than the required availability, and additional requirements are met, then the inlet
cooler unit is considered as qualified.
vSammendrag og Konklusjon
Teknologiutvikling har alltid vært en viktig satsningsområde for olje- og gassindustrien. Ny
teknologi kan effektivisere produksjonen, gi høyere utvinningsgrad eller øke fortjenesten. Im-
plementeringskostnaden er ofte høye, men innsparingen kan bli vesentlig større.
Utfordringen er at ny teknologi som regel innebærer potensielle trusler som fører med seg
høy usikkerhet. Slike trusler må identifiseres og reduseres før implementering. Dette kan opp-
nås ved å kvalifisere teknologien. Målet med kvalifiseringen, er å frembringe tilstrekkelig bevis
på at teknologien er egnet til formålet.
For å øker forståelsen rundt kvalifisering, introduserer masteroppgaven sentrale begreper,
som videre blir diskutert og sammenlignet. Disse er kvalifisering, verifisering og validering. I
tillegg blir ulike kvalifikasjonsmetoder introdusert og diskutert. Metodene beskriver hvordan
kvalifiseringsbevis skal frembringes, gjennom fysisk testing, analytisk evaluering eller integrert
kvalifisering.
Et dokumentert litteraturstudium presenterer relevante standarder, rekommandasjoner og
andre styrende dokumenter. Generelle kvalifiseringsdokumenter gir veiledning om hvordan en
generell kvalifisering bør utføres. Bedrifts-spesifikke dokumenter belyser hvordan de generelle
dokumentene er implementert, men gir også interne veiledninger. I tillegg presenteres kvalifis-
erings prosedyrer for sikkerhets instrumenterte systemer og andre komplementerende kvalifis-
eringsdokumenter .
I den generelle kvalifiseringsdokumentet, DNV-RP-A203, blir et kvalifiserings program for
ny teknologi introdusert. Dette kvalifiserings programmet representerer rammeverket for hvor-
dan et teknologi kvalifisering prosess skal gjennomføres. Prosessen omhandler et strukturer sett
med trinn, som har til hensikt å frembringe bevis på at teknologien møter bestemte kvalifiser-
ings krav. Disse trinnene er: teknologi kvalifiserings basis, teknologi vurdering, trussel vurder-
ing, teknologi kvalifiserings plan, utførelse av plan og ytelses vurdering.
Utvikling av ny teknologi, er vanligvis utført av en teknologi leverandør på oppdrag fra en
olje operatør. I slike tilfeller er flere kvalifiserings prosedyrer innblandet. Master oppgaven
diskuterer hvordan og i hvilken grad de forskjellige dokument skal følges. I tillegg identifiseres
utfordringer i prosjekter der flere parter er innblandet, mer spesifikk mellom Aker Solutions og
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Statoil.
Siste delen av masteroppgaven, inkluderer en omfattende kvalifiserings eksempel, basert
på teknologi kvalifiserings prosessen presentert i DNV-RP-A203. Utvalgt teknologi er en passiv
subsea innløps kjøler enhet. Subsea kjøleren er adoptert fra en topside-løsning, men modifis-
ert for å tåle andre og mer krevende drifts-og miljømessige forhold. I teknologi kvalifiserings
basisen er kvalifiserings kravene identifisert. Modenheten til teknologien defineres i teknologi
vurderingen. I trussel vurderingen blir teknologien analysert, og kritiske feil funnet. En kvali-
fisering plan er utviklet, hvor fire ulike aktiviteter har til hensikt å redusere de kritiske feilene.
Videre er planen utført og dokumentert, der ytelses vurderingen bedømmer i hvilke grad kval-
ifikasjonskravene er oppfylt. På grunn av utilstrekkelig materiale, er dokumentasjonen i siste
trinn mangelfull, og ingen konklusjon dratt.
Som en utvidelse av eksempelet, er en produksjonssikrings analyse utført, ved hjelp av simu-
lerings verktøyet MIRIAM Regina. En modell er modulert med hensyn til feil modi som er identi-
fisert i trussel vurderingen. Modellen er basert på forskjellige parametere, deriblant feil raten og
restaurerings tiden. Modellen er validert av et kompetente personer hos Aker Solution. Simu-
leringen er utført med et 25-års perspektiv, med 1000 gjennomkjøringer. De simulerte resul-
tatene viser at den gjennomsnittlige teknisk tilgjengelighet for innløp kjøleren er 98,93 %. Grun-
net ingen spesifiserte tilgjengelighets krav er identifisert for teknologi kvalifiserings basisen, er
det ikke trukket noen kvalifisering konklusjon. Likevel, om den simulert verdien er høyere enn
krevd for tilgjengelighet, samt at yttligere krav er oppfylt, kan innløps kjøler enhten betraktes
som kvalifisert.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the challenges in today’s oil and gas production is to extract the reservoirs more effi-
ciently. The potential of increasing the recovery rate can provide major economic benefits. In
the report "Increasing production on the Norwegian continental shelf" the Norwegian Ministry
of Petroleum and Energy, states that an increase in the production rate of 1% on the Norwe-
gian continental shelf, will provide a gross value of about 270 billion NOKs1. Such an increase
corresponds the annual subsidy that the petroleum activities contribute to the Norwegian state
coffers every year (Hansen et al., 2011).
The focus area for increasing the recovery rate has in recent years moved from traditional
topside production systems, to subsea production systems (SPS). New processing technology,
faster and more reliable information and communication technology, and new technology for
condition monitoring are some important subsea technology solutions that streamline the pro-
duction. A common development trend is that the new technology often can be considered as
an "marinization" of conventional topside equipment, but with a new twist since it must with-
stand other hostile operational and environmental conditions.
1.1 Background
Implementing new subsea technology involves significant financial expenses and uncertainties
related to the technology. The uncertainty implies a risk that should be managed and reduced
1Oil price 70 dollars/barrel, 1 dollar = 5,5NOK
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
to an acceptable level, before the technology is implemented. This is done trough a TQP. The
overall objective of the TQP is to provide a systematic approach of how the qualification should
be carried out, in order to provide traceable evidence that the technology meets specified re-
quirements for the intended use, and within an acceptable level of confidence.
The challenge in this master thesis is to introduce and analyze some of these TQP that are
relevant for the subsea petroleum industry. In addition, how the industry implements the TQP
and a qualification case with integrated RAM model shall be introduced.
Several different information channels have been used through the master thesis. The qual-
ification documents are either developed on general terms, such as DNV-RP-A203 (2011) from
by Det Norska Veritas, or more business-specific, developed by Statoil WR 1622 (2009), or the
Subsea department in Aker Solutions (2006). A more detailed description of these and other
supplementary documents are presented in Chapter 3. In addition MIRIAM Regina (2005) has
been used in order to learn the program.
1.2 Objectives
The main objectives of this Master thesis are to:
1. Perform and document an in-depth study of relevant standards and governing documen-
tation.
2. Analyze the TQP processes that are part of the manufacturer’s scope in major subsea
project execution, including:
• Use of FMECA as part of threat assessment in TQP.
• Use of reliability targets and reliability, availability, maintainability (RAM) analysis as
part of acceptance criteria in TQP.
• Use of probability of failure on demand (PFD) targets when safety integrity level (SIL)
is relevant.
3. Analyze how the TQP processes in major subsea project execution comply with relevant
standards and governing documentation and possible challenges to meet requirements.
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4. Perform a case study and describe the TQP process for chosen equipment, including FMECA,
and building and implementation of a RAM model.
1.3 Limitations
Many of today’s technology solutions deal with both hardware and software technology. While
hardware technology may be qualified through detailed design, this design does not exist for
software technology until the final program code has been developed. The technology quali-
fication processes are for that reason slightly different. Qualification of software technology is
omitted in this thesis, but some general information is still provided.
In order to limit relevant actors, two key players have been selected to represent the oil in-
dustry. These are Statoil and Aker Solutions.
1.4 Approach
A Case study is presented in Chapter 6 and 7. It is important to emphasize that this case study
is only a exemplification of the reality, and should not be read and used as a final version, but as
a guide. Some of the input to the analysis has been generalized as the focus is on the processes
described.
Although today’s business-specific qualification procedures are based on DNV-RP-A203 from
2001, this thesis is focused on the 2011 version. This is since the most recent version is more user
friendly providing better qualification flow, that most likely will be implemented at a later time.
This thesis uses the same notation as Rausand and Høyland (2004), unless otherwise is stated.
1.5 Structure of the Report
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 defines key terms and describes different
qualification methods. Chapter 3 presents important qualification literature. The technology
qualification process, defined in DNV-RP-A203, is presented in Chapter 4. The next chapter,
Chapter 5 analyzes how a qualification program is carried out by the industry. In Chapter 6, a
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case study is introduced, where a inlet cooler unit shall be qualified in accordance with DNV-
RP-A203. Outputs from some of the process stages are presented in Appendix B. In Chapter 7,
a RAM analyst is accomplished on the same Case Study. Summary and recommendations for
further work are provided in chapter 8.
Chapter 2
Technology Qualification
Technology is a generic term where scientific studies and applied sciences is applied in practical
tasks in the industry. New technology arises when existing technology is developed to a new
degree of novelty, or when technology is developed without any former characteristics.
A classic categorization of new technology is provided in Table 2.1. Here technology is cate-
gorised as unproven technology, or proven technology where the application area (environment
for the suggested technology) is new (DNV-RP-A203, 2011).
Gathering of information is important to provide sufficient evidence that new technology
will function within given operational conditions and meet specified requirement. This study
is most often done through TQP. In addition to provide evidence TQP may be used for com-
parison of different technology solutions, inputs to reliability evaluation of large systems, and
documentation of the development stages.
Table 2.1: What is new technology?
Proven Unproven
New environment
p p
Known environment × p
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2.1 Definitions
Some relevant terms related to TQP are qualification, verification and validation. These terms
are interpreted differently by different standard organizations. The presented definitions in this
thesis are adopted from DNV-RP-A203 (2011), which in turn is based on ISO 9000 (2005).
The most central term is qualification. This is defined as follows:
Z Qualification: Is the process of providing the evidence that the technology will function
within specified limits with an acceptable level of confidence.
A qualification should ensure that people, products, processes or systems functions within
specified confidence limits. This evidence may be provided by empirical evidence, predictions
using proven models or expert judgement. The confidence decides roughly which decisions
that further should be made, based on requirements that where set at the start of the qualifi-
cation process. This should been seen in relation to what extent the new technology should be
implemented, or in what extent to invest more to the new technology.
A similar term to qualification is verification. Verification is a analytical method defined as
follows:
Z Verification: Is confirmation, through provision of objective evidence, that specified require-
ments have been fulfilled.
Verification is intended to ensure that evidence through observations, measurement, tests
or other means matches obligatory or implied expectations or needs. The main similarities be-
tween verification and qualification are that both terms concern a way to "approve" something.
The difference lies in what extent the evidence needs to be provided. Verification is used in
cases with lesser extent, and little novelty, while qualification is used when the degree of novelty
is large, with correspondingly high risk of an error.
Due to the economic benefit of verifying versus qualifying, the industry does as far as pos-
sible, start with a verification. In cases where verification is not sufficient, qualification will be
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executed. This boundary is determined by expert judgment.
In the software technology, verification means to build the product right. Here are the ob-
jective evidence obtained through manual inspections and testing (Sommerville, 2010).
Guidance for performing a verification can be found in specific industry standards, such as
ISO 13628 (2006) that covers general verification tests for subsea equipment.
The last term, validation, also deals with a way to "approve". Validating is another analytical
method defined as followed:
Z Validation: Is confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that the require-
ments for a specific intended use or application have been fulfilled.
Validation is intended to ensure in what extent that evidence through observations, mea-
surement, tests or other means matches obligatory or implied expectations or needs for spe-
cific use or application area are met. The difference between verification and validation is how
the objective evidence is compared. While evidence for verifications is compared with own re-
quirements, the evidence for validation is compared with third party requirement. Validation is
therefore an important process in technology qualification which ensures laws and rules to be
followed.
In the software technology, validation means to build the right product. The objective evi-
dence is ensuring that the software does that the user really requires (Sommerville, 2010).
2.2 Qualification Methods
In order to qualify technology, this can be done in three different ways. Either by analytical
qualification, qualification by testing, or in combination like integrated qualification. The ap-
propriate method is determined in each individual case and depends on the system.
The aim is to provide a better understanding of how to reduce and manage uncertainty of
the technology.
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2.2.1 Analytical Qualification
An analytical qualification shall provide evidence through analytical methods, carried out by
suitable software solutions or expert judgment, that provide evidence based on estimated val-
ues . In recent years, many reliable software solutions have been developed to visualize different
problems of a product. Examples of software solutions that can be used to visualize problems,
are computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and finite element (FEM) analysis. CFD provides ev-
idence for flow problems that equipment is exposed to, while FEM analysis provides evidence
for complex elasticity and structural analysis problems.
The advantage of using analytical qualification, is that physical models not necessarily have
to be built. In addition, qualifying through software solutions are time-efficient, since detailed
analysis by the software is performed considerably faster that real physical testing. The dis-
advantages of using analytical qualification, is that the model that are analyzed must be built
correctly to ensure proper estimate. In addition, the modulated software solutions is basis on
reflections of reality, where misinterpretations designed in software can provide differences be-
tween real and estimated values.
Analytical Qualification is often used to qualify complex and expensive equipment, due to
the time and cost savings. In cases where analytical qualification do not provide sufficient ev-
idence, qualification by testing must be carried out. Analytical qualification is also associated
with qualitative qualification.
2.2.2 Qualification by Testing
The most traditional way to provide evidence through qualification, is by testing. Testing is a
time consuming and costly process, which is carried when analytical qualification is not suffi-
cient. The advantage is that it provides improved and more accurate evidence of the technology.
This evidence is also called empirical evidence.
The major disadvantage of qualification by testing, is cost which is very high compared to the
analytical qualification. The extent of testing is determined by the uncertainty of the technology.
A test program shall be developed in such a way that it provides necessary evidence that reduces
the uncertainty to an acceptable level.
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For hardware technology, testing shall be carried out on a physical prototype. The prototype
may be a simplification of the end product, but the essential parts that shall be tested must be
present. For software technology, the testing shall be performed after the final code has been
developed.
Qualification by testing is also referred to as quantitative qualification.
2.2.3 Integrated Qualification
The combination of analytical qualification and qualification by testing are often described as
integrated qualification.
In large and complex systems, it is rarely necessary to qualify after a particular method. In
such cases it is advantageous to use integrated qualification. Since qualification by testing is
often an expensive method of qualification, only equipment that really needs to qualify through
tests, is carried out by qualification by testing. The remaining equipment is qualified through
analytical qualification. Such implementation minimizes the necessary qualifications cost and
time consumption.
The method can also be combined in other ways. In cases where physical testing is difficult
to monitor, such as high pressure scenario, analytical qualification could be used to qualify this
level. The analytical result on a low pressure scenario is combined and compared to fit the
results from the physical scenario. The analytical model is validated by the physical model, and
reflects the reality. The high pressure scenario may thus be qualified using the analytical model.
In a third case, both methods are used in parallel and evaluate the same problem. This
method most often used when uncertainties are not permitted, and where the acceptable level
of confidence shall be high.
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Chapter 3
Technology Qualification Related
Documents
To qualify new technology, several standards and governing documentation must be consid-
ered. These documents provide guidance, requirements, and input to the process. Figure 3.1
gives examples of such inputs, and shows that the TQP must meet both company-specific and
general documentation.
The next sections discuss the scope and use of core documents. General documents are first
presented. Business-specific documents follows, and describes how general documents are im-
plemented by the companies. Qualification of safety instrumented systems (SIS) and supple-
mentary documents are also presented.
3.1 General Qualification Documents
Implementation of new technology requires that the technology is sufficiently proven, for in-
stance by a TQP. The program should introduce a systematic and structured process that iden-
tifies and sufficiently reduces the uncertainties to the technology.
Several documents have recently been made to provide guidance for the qualification. Such
qualifications guidelines are for instance developed by Det Norske Veritas and the American
Petroleum Institute. In addition, NASA has developed the technology readiness level (TRL) con-
cept, that is a measurement system for systematically assessing the maturity of a particular tech-
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Figure 3.1: Relevant documents for the TQP.
nology.
3.1.1 DNV-RP-A203
DNV-RP-A203 (2011) is one of the most commonly used guidances for qualification of new hard-
ware and software technology. The guidance, which is released as a recommended practice (RP),
is developed by Det Norske Veritas and was first published in 2001. The current version was pub-
lished in 2011, where better guidance was introduced based on 10 years of experience. The early
version has been totally redesigned, provided better and more logical qualification flow, as well
as improved and more specific examples and guidance notes. The 2011 version has become
more user friendly than its predecessor, but does still have the same area of coverage. Today, the
DNV-RP-A203 is considered as state of the art, by the oil industry.
DNV-RP-A203 introduce a TQP that represent the framework of the qualification. TQP is
used to systematically exclude uncertainties and thereby provide technical evidence of the tech-
nology. The program is suitable for offshore components, equipment and assemblies, and used
in exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons on the Norwegian continental shelf, but may
also be adopted for use other places. The objective to the TQP is to present a systematic ap-
proach on how to qualify and document new technology, through all stages of application. This
is achieved by implementing a project execution model (PEM) (e.g., concept evaluation, pre-
engineering and detailed engineering) within the TQP.
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Within the TQP, a technology qualification process is introduced. The technology qualifica-
tion process, illustrated in Figure 4.1, deals with a structured set of steps, assembled in series
and connected to a modification stage, which ensures that uncertainties are reduced to an ac-
ceptable level and documented prior to approved qualification. The process steps presented in
the current version are:
1. Technology Qualification Basis: The first stage is where the qualification basis is estab-
lished. All facts to the new technology are identified such as its function, intended use,
expectations to the technology as well as its qualification objectives.
2. Technology Assessment: This step performs an assessment of the technology and deter-
mines its degree of novelty where its key challenges and uncertainties are identified.
3. Threat Assessment: The threat assessment identifies the failure modes of the technology,
and corresponding failure mechanisms as well as associated risk.
4. Technology Qualification Plan: The technology qualification plan is used to provide nec-
essary qualification evidence on how to manage potential unacceptable failure modes.
5. Execution of the Plan: The planned activities are executed, and qualification evidence ob-
tained through experience, numerical analysis and tests.
6. Performance Assessment: The last step concerns a review where the qualification evidence
is assessed against the technology qualification basis.
Modification: The aim of the modification is to reduces occurrence of non-acceptable
elements, removes failure mode of concern, improve the confidence or reduce the cost.
If the technology in the performance assessment meets the requirements stated in the tech-
nology qualification basis, the technology is considered as qualified. If not, the technology must
be modified to achieve these requirements .
A more detailed description of the technology qualification process is given in Chapter 4. In
addition, Chapter 6 and 7 provide a case study, based on this process.
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3.1.2 API-RP-17Q
Another qualification procedure, API-RP-17Q (2010), is released as a RP by the American Petroleum
Institute. The current version, issued June 2010, is the first edition. API-RP-17Q provides a sys-
tematic method with a structured framework for qualification of subsea technology, but unlike
DNV-RP-A203 that covers both hardware and software technology, API-RP-17Q is specific for
subsea equipment.
The method starts with a breakdown of the subsea equipment into component-levels. These
components are further categorized into classes of equipment or component functionality, which
is used to identify the components. The qualification process is based on failure mode assess-
ment (FMA) and product qualification sheet (PQS), where both supplier and operator in coop-
eration develop acceptance criteria and requirements for the technology. The FMA is a modified
method of FMECA, and shall be presented in a FMA template (modified FMECA template). The
PQS shall similarly be presented in component-specific templates, which contain information
about each component, operating parameters, qualification requirements, interfaces and addi-
tional comments. The PQS shall be maintained through the qualification, and represents the
final qualification documentation of a component.
The qualification takes place through exchange of the FMA and PQS, between the supplier
and the operator. The technology is considered qualified when the acceptance criteria and re-
quirements are met.
3.1.3 Technology Readiness Level
A common way to illustrate the progress in a TQP is by TRL. TRL is not a procedure, such as DNV-
RP-A203 and API-RP-17Q, but deals with a systematic measurement system where the maturity
of a particular technology is assessed.
The original TRL were developed by NASA in the middle of 1970s, for the aerospace industry.
NASA needed a system to indicate how far a particular technology was developed, and whether
or not it was ready to be used (NASA, 1995). The method was initially developed with seven
levels, but over time it was expanded to include nine levels. These runs from TRL1 to TRL9,
where the lowest level indicates the basic principles observed and reported for a technology,
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Table 3.1: TRL adopted form WR 1622.
Level (TRL) Development stage Description
0 Unproven Idea Paper Concept. No analysis or testing has been performed
1 Analytically Proven Functionality proven by analysis, reference to common features of
Concept existing technology or testing on individual subcomponents
/subsystems. The concept may not meet all of the technical
requirements at this level, but demonstrates the basic functionality
with promise to meet all the requirements with additional testing.
2 Physically Proven Concept design or novel features of design validated by model or
Concept small scale testing in laboratory environment. The system validates
that it can function in a "realistic" environment with the key
environmental parameters simulated.
3 Prototype Tested Full scale prototype built and put through product qualification test
program. The prototype is tested in a robust designed development
test program over a limited range of operating conditions to
demonstrate is functionality.
4 Environment Tested Full scale prototype (or production unit) built and put through a
qualification test program in (simulated or actual) intended
environment.
5 System Integration Full scale prototype (or production unit) built and integrated into
Tested intended operating system with full interface and functionality tests.
6 System Installed Full scale prototype (or production unit) built and integrated into
intended operating system with full interface and functionality test
program in intended environment. The technology has successfully
operated < 10% of its expected life.
7 Proven Technology Production unit integrated into intended operating system. The
technology has successfully operated with acceptable performance
and reliability for > 10% of its specified life.
and the highest level proves the technology through successful operation.
Other industries have adopted and modified the fundamental idea behind TRL, such as
API-RP-17N (2009) which presents a TRL for the subsea industry. Table 3.1 shows a version,
modified by Statoil. The table indicates the maturity progressing through eight levels, where the
levels are defined from a minimum of 0, corresponds to an unproved idea, to a maximum of
7, corresponding to a proven technology. Technology assigned with TRL≥4 is considered to be
qualified.
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3.2 Business-Specific Documents
The implementation of technology qualification in companies is done through own business-
specific documents. These documents present company customized qualification programs,
which is primarily based on interpretation of qualification specific documents and own reflec-
tions related to qualification. In this subsection, the business-specific documents of Statoil and
Aker Solutions are presented.
3.2.1 Statoil - WR 1622
WR 1622 (2009) is a work process requirement (WR) developed by Statoil to provide guidance in
qualification of new technology within the company and to vendors that offer new technology
to Statoil. The current version is 5.05 and was released in December 2009. WR1622 is mainly
based on DNV-RP-A203 and safety management practices from API-RP-17N, and describes how
these documents should be implemented in Statoil. The current version of DNV-RP-A203 was
released after version 5.05 became valid, so WR1622 is based on the 2001 version of DNV-RP-
A203, with a process flow that is different from the one presented in section 3.1.1. The aim of
the document is to define all additional activities that must be conducted in addition to the
qualification activities adopted in DNV-RP-A203.
The qualification progress in WR1622 is based on Statoil’s internal PEM, from the Statoil
document, FR05. The model describes six stages that new technology within Statoil progresses.
Between the stages, different decision gates (DG) are presented as milestones, from DG0 to DG4.
In parallel with the PEM, the TRL is presented to show the maturity of the technology in various
steps. A technology is considered to be qualified and ready to be implemented when all qualifi-
cation activities are successfully completed in addition to TRL≥4 are met at milestone DG3.
The necessity of a qualification is identified in a technology assessment, that documents the
risk and opportunity of the technology. The assessment classifies the technology as specified in
DNV-RP-A203, but in a more strict way since it indicates to which extent the technology is new
to Statoil, while DNV-RP-A203 classifies knowledge in relation to the industry. Technology in WR
1622, that is classified as 2 or higher shall be qualified through more activities. These activities
follow the technology qualification process described in 2001 version of DNV-RP-A203.
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WR1622 also presents requirements for qualification of new technology with and without
fall-back solutions. Qualification based on fall-back solutions is less critical, since the fall-back
solution can be used where qualification fails. Qualification without fall-back solutions is totally
dependent on successful qualification, and therefore more critical. Qualification activities for
no fall-back solutions are thus dependent on an earlier start to ensure that the technology can
be developed.
3.2.2 Aker Solutions - Technology Qualification Procedure
The qualification guidance developed by Aker Solutions (2006) for the subsea department1, is
titled "Technology qualification procedure". The procedure was developed to ensure that re-
quirement from the client as well as statutory rules and regulations are met through the qual-
ification. The client is herein identified as Statoil. For other clients, the guidance shall be re-
assessed to ensure that requirements stated by the client are included. The current version was
released September 2006, and is thus bases on the 2001 version of DNV-RP-A203 as well as a
former version of WR 1622.
The guidance introduces a five steps qualification process, where each step indicates the
work to be done, or which report that shall be made. A qualification is identified through the
technology gap analysis, where TRL consideration and maturity classification is made. A tech-
nology where TRL≥4, or classified higher than 1 shall be qualified. The last steps deal with a
formal qualification report, where sufficient qualification evidence shall be stated. The technol-
ogy is considered to be qualified when the TRL≥4, and stated requirement is met.
3.3 Qualification of Safety Instrumented Systems
SIS can be installed to reduce the risk in a hazardous system. SIS is an independent protec-
tion system comprising sensors, logic, solver(s), and actuating items (also called final elements)
which is designed to prevent and mitigate risk associated with safety-critical applications (Rau-
sand and Høyland, 2004), and to maintain a safe state for the equipment under control (EUC).
1Original designed by Aker Kvaerner Subsea
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For the subsea industry, SIS are usually grouped into process control (PC) systems and pro-
cess shutdown (PSD) systems.
For new subsea technology that is categorized as SIS, there are several requirements that
shall be followed. These requirements are generally stated in IEC 61508 (2010) and IEC 61511
(2003). In addition, the guideline, OLF 070 (2004), has adopted and simplified these standards
for the Norwegian Petroleum Industry.
3.3.1 IEC 61508
IEC 61508 (2010), is the main standard for SIS that are based on electrical/ electronic/ pro-
grammable electronic (E/E/PE) technology. In IEC 61508 the E/E/PE safety-related system is
referred to as SIS. The standard is generic, which means that SIS requirements for multiple in-
dustries are covered. The standard has two main objectives, where the first is to facilitate for
development of sector specific standards2. The second objective is to serve as a guideline for
development of SIS where no sector specific standard exists. The standard is mainly used for
managing new technology, learning from previous accidents, and to standardize the applica-
tion of SIS for safety application.
IEC 61508 is divided into seven parts. The initial tree parts (part 1 - 3) are normative parts
which presents the requirements for the SIS hardware and software, while the remaining four
parts (part 4 - 7) are supporting documents providing guidelines, examples and other informa-
tive annexes to the standard.
Part 1: General requirements
Part 2: Requirements for E/E/PE safety-related systems
Part 3: Software requirements
Part 4: Definitions and abbreviations
Part 5: Examples of methods for the determination of SIL
Part 6: Guidelines on the application of IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-3
Part 7: Overview of techniques and measures
2Examples of some sector specific SIS standards are IEC 61511(process industry), IEC 62061(machinery indus-
try), IEC 61513 (nuclear power plant) and IEC 50126/IEC 50128/IEC 50129 (railway application).
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Figur 3.2: Safety life cycle adopted from IEC 61508.
IEC 61508 can also be used to develop and qualify SIS technology. This is done through
the safety life cycle, illustrated in Figure 3.2. The cycle comprises 16 phases where the first five
phases (phase 1 - 5) are risk analysis phases, which identify the safety functions requirements,
reliability requirements and specifications of SIL requirements. In these phases risk analyses are
conducted, reliability requirements are allocated, and SIL requirements are set based on tables.
The next phases (phase 6 - 13), are the design and construction phases. These phases de-
scribe how the SIS should be designed and constructed in accordance with SIL requirements
and how the agreement with the requirements shall be verified.
The last phases (phase 14 - 16)are the operation and maintenance phases. These phases are
intended to ensure that operation and maintenance are designing in such a way that the SIL
performance is maintained. In addition, the actual SIL level is identified.
3.3.2 IEC 61511
One of the sector-specific standards, that is developed from the generic standard IEC 61508, is
IEC 61511 (2003) for the process industry. The aim of the standard is to provide safety require-
ments and guidelines through the life cycle, which ensure that that the systems are in a safe state.
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The standard customizes the requirements stated in the generic standard and makes them more
process-specific. In addition, two fundamental concepts are adopted, safety lifecycle and SIL.
The standard is divided into three parts, where part 1 contains hardware and software re-
quirements for SIS in the process sector. The other two parts (part 2 -3) are supportive parts
providing guidelines for use of part 1.
Part 1: Framework, definitions, systems, hardware and software requirements.
Part 2: Guidelines for the application of IEC 61511-1.
Part 3: Guidance for the determination of the required SIL.
Although the standard is specific for the process industry, there are still some situations
where the end user must use the generic standard, IEC 61508. This is when:
• The SIS technology is new, having no proven-in-use documentation.
• The proven technology is used in new not intended application areas
• The safety instrumented function (SIF) is assigned SIL4 requirements.
• Full variability language is used when programming the software technology.
Due to these situations, qualification of SIS technology must follow the requirements pre-
sented in IEC 61508.
3.3.3 OLF 070
OLF 070 (2004) is a guideline developed by the Norwegian Oil Association (OLF), intended for
the Norwegian petroleum industry. The aim of OLF 070 is to provide the industry a guideline of
how IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 should be used on the Norwegian continental shelf, and to ensure
that the requirements made by the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) are satisfied3.
3For additional information, see: http://www.itk.ntnu.no/sil/
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3.4 Supplementary Qualification Documents
In addition to the documents above, several supplementary documents are used through the
qualification. These documents ensure that the technology is able to meet specified functional
requirements and reliability targets in design and operation. Examples of such standards is ISO
13628, ISO 20815 and IEC 60300-3-4.
3.4.1 ISO 13628
The international standard ISO 13628 (2006) "Petroleum and natural gas industries - Design and
operation of subsea production systems" is the main standard where requirements and overall
recommendations for design and operation of SPS are provided. The standard is currently di-
vided into eleven parts, but is continually expanded as new specific subsea equipment is stan-
dardized. The first part covers general requirements and recommendations, while the remain-
ing parts concern more specific subsea equipment and systems, such as subsea umbilicals and
subsea production control systems. The different parts of the standard are regularly updated
and replaced, as new technology within a product group is developed and proven.
The standard shall be used to obtain information in design, fabrication, testing, installation
and operation of the specific subsea equipment.
Part 1: General requirements and recommendations
Part 2: Unbonded flexible pipe systems for subsea and marine applications
Part 3: Through flowline (TFL) systems
Part 4: Subsea wellhead and tree equipment
Part 5: Subsea umbilicals
Part 6: Subsea production control systems
Part 7: Completion/workover riser systems
Part 8: Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) interfaces on SPS
Part 9: Remotely Operated Tools (ROT) intervention systems
Part 10: Specification for bonded flexible pipe
Part 11: Flexible pipe systems for subsea and marine applications
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Part 15: Subsea structures and manifolds
In addition, several parts are under preparation (part 12,14, 16 and 17, stated in part 15)
3.4.2 ISO 20815
ISO 20815 (2010) is the production assurance and reliability management standard for the petroleum,
petrochemical and natural gas industries. The aim of the standard is to provide processes and
activities, requirements and guidelines that ensured available production for oil and gas produc-
tion, processing or other similar activities. This is achieved through reliability and maintenance
analysis of the equipment.
API-RP-17N (2009) may be used as guidance for implementation of ISO 20815 within a sub-
sea project.
3.4.3 IEC 60300-3-4
IEC 60300-3-4 (2008) is the dependability management standard that provides guide to the spec-
ification of dependability requirements. The standard provides guidance on how to formulate
and set reliability, maintainability and availability requirements for a system. In the oil and
gas industry this standard is used by the operator and the technology supplier, which provides
requirements to a new technology. In order to consider the technology as qualified, these re-
quirements have to be met.
Chapter 4
Technology Qualification Process
The DNV-RP-203A that is presented in Section 3.1.1, provides a systematic approach to qualifi-
cation of new technology. The technology qualification process that is illustrated in Figure 4.1,
comprises six main steps, together with a modification stage that continually strives to improve
the confidence in the technology.
Modification step deals with a modification that aims to reduce the critical failures to an
acceptable level, in order to meet qualification requirements.
Each step in this process shall be sufficiently documented to arrive at the conclusion. This
Qualification Basis
Technology Assessment
Threat Assessment
Qualification Plan
Performance Assessment
RM?
Qualified
M
o d
i f i
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t i o
n
Execution of the Plan
Yes
No
Figure 4.1: Technology qualification process modified from DNV-RP-A203. The technology is
regarded as qualified, when the the requirements are met (RM).
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implies that the level of detail increases with the progress of the TQP.
4.1 Technology Qualification Basis
The qualification basis is the first step in the TQP, and is considered to be the most important
step, since information which forms the basis for the technology is stated here. The qualifi-
cation basis defines where and how the technology is intended to be used, as well as expecta-
tions, requirements and acceptance criteria through the life cycle. DNV-RP-A203 divides this
into technology- and requirement specification.
The technology specification deals with basic information related to the new technology,
covering general descriptions, limitations and classification, as well as identification of relevant
standards and governing documentation. The technology specification identifies to which de-
gree the technology is new in relation to existing evidence and gives necessary expertise for
developing and qualifying the technology.
The requirement specification is quantitative targets that the technology must meet in order
to be qualified. Such targets are cost limits, schedules, RAM targets, SHE requirements and
functional values.
In order to consider a technology as qualified, both the technology- and requirement speci-
fications must be fulfilled through the technology qualification process.
4.2 Technology Assessment
The second step is the technology assessment which is a threefold analysis stage that determines
the degree of novelty of the technology and a hazard identification. This is done through tech-
nology composition analysis, technology categorization and identification of main challenges
and uncertainties. The assessment is carried out through inputs from the previous step.
Technology composition analysis is a top-down decomposition assessment where the tech-
nology is divided from system level into appropriate decomposition elements. This analysis is
used to identify novelty in- and interfaces between- elements and systems to the technology.
The output from the technology composition analysis is further used in the technology cate-
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Table 4.1: The level of technology novelty.
Level of technology maturity
Limited New or
Applicationa area Proven field history unproven
Known 1 2 3
Limited knowledge 2 3 4
New 3 4 4
gorization. The technology categorization is a method developed in DNV-RP-A203 to determine
which, and to what extent the system level or separate elements of a technology are novel. The
method is illustrated in Table 4.1, where the novelty is based both on the novelty of the technol-
ogy itself, and what extent the technology is applied. The following categories are used:
1. No new technology uncertainties (proven technology).
2. New technology uncertainties.
3. New technology challenges.
4. Demanding new technical challenges.
Technology within category 1 is already proven. Previous qualifications are used to document
the evidence. Technology within category 2, 3 and 4 are categorized as new technology with
associated uncertainty. These technologies need to reduce the uncertainty through further steps
in the TQP, before it may be considered as qualified technology.
Another novelty assessment is obtained by the TRL approach, which is described in Section
3.1.3. Although both TRL and technology categorization indicates novelty of a technology, it is
important to emphasize that TRL is a complementary method, and not an alternative. This is be-
cause TRL indicates technology development stage, while technology categorization describes
to what degree the technology needs to be qualified.
Identification of main challenges and uncertainties is the last analysis in the technology as-
sessment. This analysis provides increased understanding of the unproved technology, through
hazard identification (HAZID).
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Table 4.2: Failure mode frequency categories.
Catrgory Frequency Class Description
A Incredible occurs once per 10 000 years or more seldom
B Very unlikely occurs once per 1 000 - 10 000 years
C Unlikely occurs once per 100 - 1 000 years
D Occational occurs once per 10 - 100 years
E Probable occurs once per 1 - 10 years
F Frequent occurs more often than ones per year
4.3 Treat Assessment
All new technology identified in the technology assessment shall be followed-up by a threat as-
sessment. This step deals with identification of failure modes and failure mechanism, where as-
sociated risk is assessed and assigned criticality. This is carried out by expert judgment, through
information gathered from the technology qualification basis. The assessment should iden-
tify all possible failure modes and mechanisms that can occur through the life of the technol-
ogy. Several methods are designed to carry out this assessment, but the most common is Fail-
ure mode, effect and criticality analysis (FMECA) described in IEC 60812 (2006) "Analysis tech-
niques for system reliability - procedure for failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)". FMECA
is a systematic method to use, but considers only one failure mode at a time which excludes
combination of failures.
Frequency of failure is assigned in order to estimate frequency to each failure mode. These
estimates shall be based on quantitative evidence provided from reliability data bases, test result
or other approved sources. In cases where estimates are lacking, conservative estimates shall be
assigned by expert judgment. The specified frequency classes are then assigned according to
the frequency value. An example of such classes is show in Table 4.2, where every class deals
with a frequency interval.
In the same way, the consequence of failure is identified for each failure mode. This identi-
fication is based on expert judgment where the severity level is assigned to the consequence to
the failure mode. The consequence class must be chosen to suit the failure modes. An example
of consequence categories is illustrated in Table 4.3. Each failure mode is categorized as strictly
as possible, where the highest level of label is assigned where one or more of the descriptions
fits.
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Table 4.3: Failure mode consequence categories.
Description
Category Label Human Effect
Environment Component/ Production Effect-
Effect System Effect System Level
1 Very minor
No or superficial Insignificant No function Zero Production
injuries pollution loss loss
2 Minor
Minor injuries, Minor pollution Loss of Minor to zero
involving no loss with no impact redundancy production loss
time
3 Moderate
Injury involving Moderate Minor component Loss of a
some lost time pollutions. Release breakdown/loss of percentage of
above reportable minor functionality production for a
limit or minor short periode
impact
4 Major
Serious injuries, Large pollution. Loss of Loss of some
less than 2 month Significant impact, components major precentage of
absence some remedation functionality production for
required a long period
5 Catastrophic
People- Fatality, Very large Total loss of Complete loss of
serious injuries, pollution. Serious components production for a
invalidity, absence impact, significant function long periode
>60d remediation
required
At the end of the threat assessment, the frequency- and consequence- of failure are com-
bined in a suitable risk matrix, illustrated in Table 4.2. The criticality to the specific failure mode
are identified as Low- ((L) indicates acceptable risk), Medium- ((M) indicates unacceptable risk,
ALARP-region) or High- risk ((H) indicates unacceptable risk). Failure modes with medium-
and high- risk are considered as critical and unacceptable. These failure modes shall further be
covered by a technology qualification plan.
4.4 Technology Qualification Plan
A technology qualification plan is developed to manage unacceptable failure modes identified
in the threat assessment. The plan shall provide activities that shall obtain reliable evidence
and meet requirements stated in the technology qualification basis. The activities shall first of
all seek to reduce the failure modes with highest uncertainties. In order to execute the prior-
itized reduction in a good manner, a milestone plan should be developed. A milestone plan
provides significant value to the qualification scheduling, since it determines whether or not
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Figure 4.2: Risk matrix of the different failure modes.
the qualification is on schedule, through managing of various activities.
In order to ensure that every activity reaches sufficient evidence and requirements one or
several qualification methods are used. How many and which qualification method that is suit-
able depends mainly on the characteristics of the failure mode, or the requirements stated in the
technology qualification basis. For example will quantitative requirement call for a quantitative
qualification method. The qualification method may be numerical or analytical analyses, exper-
iments, testing, empirically justified trough previous experience or similar methods which are
intended to build confidence. The qualification methods should in the same way as the failure
mode cover the entire life of the technology. In cases which deals with technology with high cost
frame multiple qualification method should be used, since this will strengthen the qualification
evidence.
4.5 Execution of the Plan
After successfully developing a technology qualification plan, this may be executed and evi-
dence provided through experience, analysis and tests. This step is the most time and cost con-
suming in the technology qualification process, indicating the importance of well-chosen and
planned activities in the technology qualification plan.
Every activity with associated methods is carried out, where generated data is gathered, doc-
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umented and organized in appropriate means, ensure traceability through the technology qual-
ification process. The quality of the collected data should be evaluated during the data collec-
tion, ensuring reliable data.
In cases where undetected failure modes are detected during the execution, this shall be
documented and evaluated, and given necessary actions.
4.6 Performance Assessment
The last step in the technology qualification process is the performance assessment. This as-
sessment is intended to conclude whether or not a new technology may be regarded as proven.
A proven technology shall confirm that both risk and uncertainty is reduced to an acceptable
level through the life cycle, and where requirements from the technology qualification basis is
met. In cases where technology does not meet stated requirements, further qualification ac-
tivities can be identified. Such activities may be enhanced inspection, maintenance or other
repair strategies. If the technology still does not meet requirements after the further activities,
the technology qualification is considered as failed.
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Chapter 5
TQP in Major Subsea Project
The willingness to develop and adopt new technologies on the Norwegian continental shelf has
been one of the driving forces behind the strong international position to the Norwegian oil
and gas industry. This is a result of good interactions between Norwegian oil operators, tech-
nology suppliers and research environments (Hansen et al., 2011), concerning safe and reliable
solutions. This is achieved by qualifying the technology.
5.1 Valid Guidelines
Development of subsea technology is mainly initiated by oil operators or technology suppliers.
The oil operators, performing oil and gas activities, need solutions for their activities. The tech-
nology suppliers frequently provide solutions for these activities and can also develop and offer
new technology. When the supplier provides technology to oil operators, the operator requires
that the supplier qualifies the technology using the qualification guideline provided by the op-
erator. This is due to the fact that the operator is regarded as the responsible user, from the time
the technology is being applied. When the suppliers develop technology for own purpose, no
specific end user is identified, and the technology is qualified by own guidelines.
Two widely known oil operator and technology suppliers in Norway are Statoil and Aker So-
lutions respectively. Their business-specific documents are presented in Chapter 3. The extent
of these documents varies, but a common feature is that they are based on the DNV qualifica-
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Aker Solutions, TQ Procedure
Statoil WR 1622
DNV-RP-A203
Single Double All
Aker Solutions, TQ Procedure
DNV-RP-A203
Statoil WR 1622
Figure 5.1: Coverage rate between selected documents. The size of the squares represents the
scope of each document.
tion document, DNV-RP-A2031. Figure 5.1 indicates the extent and interactions between Aker
Solutions procedure in relation to Statoil’s procedure and DNV-RP-A203. The figure shows that
the qualification procedures of both Aker Solutions and Statoil partially cover DNV-RP-A203,
but in slightly different ways. Both procedures adopt, modify and extend the content of DNV-
RP-A203, but in a way that it fits their business model. The technical part is similar, the admin-
istrative part is different. The figure also shows that the extent of Aker Solutions procedures,
are somewhat larger than Statoil’s WR 1622. This is due to the qualification procedures to Aker
Solutions serves as a bridging document between DNV-RP-A203 and the client document WR
1622. This is also due to the fact that Aker Solutions as a supplier to Statoil, qualifies equipment
by the technical part of the Statoil qualification guideline, and the administrative part of their
own qualification guideline. Such an implementation is in accordance with the requirements
of the operator. Consequently, Aker Solutions must modify and customize their own procedure
when technology developed for other clients than Statoil shall be qualified.
The challenge of qualifying technology through these guidelines is that the documents are
based on a previous version of DNV-RP-A203 from 2001, which is somewhat unsystematic. The
latest version of DNV-RP-A203 was released summer 2011, and was developed with the intention
to be more user friendly2. By implementing the 2011 version of DNV-RP-A203 into the Aker
Solutions and Statoil documents, will provide better qualification guidance.
12001 version of the DNV-RP-A203
2Chapter 6 presents a case study based on this new edition.
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Figure 5.2: TQP in low and high risk projects.
5.2 Strategic Implementation of TQP in Projects
Implementation of TQP is dependent on the type of project. In the next section, different im-
plementation strategies is discussed, in relation to some project types.
5.2.1 TQP in Low and High Risky Projects
Qualification and development are two terms that are closely related. During technology de-
velopment, technology considered as new, needs to be qualified prior to implementation. This
leads to the TQP session always is executed near the end of a technology development. The
length and the starting point of the TQP however, is dependent on the type of the project.
Project types can roughly be divided into two, low risk projects and high risk projects. This is
illustrated in figure 5.2. Low risk projects are recognized as projects with sufficient time, such as
a pilot project where technology is developing without any specific end-user. In such projects,
the technology is developed to a certain level prior to initiating the qualification program. This
affects the project’s duration, since development and qualification may be carried out in parallel
towards the end. Due to long development it increases the likelihood of a successful qualifica-
tion. The opposite is high risk project, which is recognized as a project with short duration.
Reduced time consumption increases the efficiency of the project implementation. Develop-
ment and TQP are conducted more or less in parallel all the time. Short horizon increase the
likelihood of inadequate qualification.
Another disadvantages with short horizon is cost. In addition to the need of parallel pro-
cesses, the activities within the processes should be performed more efficiently. In order to save
time, these activities are run in parallel. Such a parallelization may lead to purchase of equip-
ment prior to the end of the qualification. Such a purchase is only based on analytical qual-
ification, where qualification through tests is lacking. This may be a risky decision, since the
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Figure 5.3: TQP in fall-back and non fall-back projects.
qualification program may require a modification prior to qualified equipment. In such cases,
new equipment must be purchased, which implies that new costs are incurred.
This may be a risky decision, since the qualification program may require a modification of
the purchased equipment. Ultimately, new equipment may be repurchased, forcing cost to be
increased.
5.2.2 TQP in Delivery Projects
Delivery projects are recognized as projects where a delivery will take place within the time
frame of the project. The specific delivery can be considered as a technology that is developed
for another party. An example, is the relationship between Aker Solutions and Statoil, where
Aker Solutions develops technology for Statoil. A delivery is expected to happen when the tech-
nology development is complete. If the technology has reached minimum TRL4, this indicates
that the technology is qualified3.
For a specific delivery, it is important to provide the required product within a time frame.
For that reason, a fall-back solution is often required as back-up, should the qualification fail.
This will increase the ability to deliver on time. In lack of fall-back solution, the technology is
fully dependent on successful outcome of the qualification. If the qualification fails, no solution
is available
The implementation strategy of the TQP, is dependent on weather a fall-back solution exists
or not. This is due to the criticality of inadequate qualification, when fall-back solutions do
not exist. As illustrated in Figure 5.3, the TQP have to start in an earlier stage for no fall-back
solution, than when a fall-back solution exists.
3TQ?=Is the technology qualified?(DG).
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When fall-back solution exists, the delivery is not fully depend on the result of the qualifi-
cation. Therefore, the TQP should starts at the most optimal timing, in relation to time, cost
and resources. For a non fall-back solution, no backup solutions exists, an the delivery is fully
dependent on successfully outputs from the TQP. The TQP for non fall-back solutions should
therefore start as early as possible in the technology development, to ensure that the technol-
ogy will satisfy the qualification requirements.
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Chapter 6
Case Study
This chapter presents a case study where a relevant subsea system is chosen to illustrate the
TQP, described in the 2011 version of DNV-RP-A203. The chosen system is part of the Åsgard
Subsea Compression Project (ÅSCP) which is a pioneering technology development in SPS. The
Åsgard Subsea Compression Project was initiated by Statoil to maintain a stable production flow
from the Midgard and Mikkel reservoirs. The engineering contractor and provider of technology
is Aker Solutions, that develop the subsea compression system based on experience from the
Ormen Lange Pilot project.
The compression system has two identical compression trains, which operate mainly in par-
allel. Each train is divided into several physical modules, including an passive inlet cooler mod-
ule. The inlet cooler module consists of jumpers, valves, instrumentations, module frame, mod-
ule pipes and inlet cooler unit. The inlet cooler unit is further selected for this case study.
The case study is conducted in collaboration with the technology supplier, where informa-
tion is gathered through meetings with responsible engineers. Due to confidential material,
certain details are left out or anonymized.
6.1 Description of the Inlet Cooler Unit
The inlet cooler unit has two functions, continusly cooling down the well stream and on an in-
termittent varies serving as anti-surge cooler for the compressor. The cooler is passive and heat
is transferred to the surrounding seawater. The primary function and with the highest cooling
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!
Figure 6.1: A simplified illustration of the inlet cooler unit.
duty is when the compressor runs in recycle when it protects the machine from overheating.
This is the most critical operation phase, applicable to the start-up, shut-down and low produc-
tion phases. The secondary function applies during normal operation, ensuring that the inlet
multiphase flow is sufficiently cooled, thus increasing the compressor efficiency.
6.2 Technology Qualification Process
The ÅSCP is categorized as a delivery project where Aker Solutions is supposed to deliver the
physical compression system within 2014 (Hansen et al., 2011). Due to the short deadline,
the technology qualification process is carried out in parallel with the technology development
throughout the entire project. As described in Chapter 5, this implies an additional high cost
and uncertainty to the project, but the time consumption is reduced. In addition, the project
is totally dependent on a successful outcome, due lack of fall-back solutions. However, expert
judgment considers the project to be feasible, and the economic risk as low.
The expert team in this case study has both wide and narrow experience, but key players
such as participation from manufacturer and operator are lacking. Since this is only a case study,
it is judged acceptable. The team member’s expertise is identified in Table 6.1.
A theoretical description of the qualification procedure is presented in Chapter 4. The pro-
cess flowis visualised in Figure 4.1. The modification loop is used in cases of insufficient quali-
fication.
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Table 6.1: Qualification team.
Personnel Subject Responsibility Company
Participant 1 TQP enginering TQP follow up Aker Solutions, Subsea
Participant 2 Project Engineer Design Inlet Cooler Aker Solutions, Subsea
Participant 3 RAMS enginering NA Aker Solutions, Subsea
Eirik Horpestad Student Facilitator NTNU, IPK
6.2.1 Qualification Basis
The purpose for the qualification basis is to present the requirements to the inlet cooler unit.
Technology Specification
One of the challenges during operation of the inlet cooler unit is the risk of hydrate formation.
Hydrate formation is like ice and is hydrocarbon gas and water formed at high pressure and low
temperature, higher than normal freezing point for water. During operation, the multiphase
well stream is cooled, and the hydrate condition may be reached inside the cooler. The design of
the inlet cooler unit must therefore deal with hydrate control. By mixing mono-ethylene glycol
(MEG) into the process stream the freezing point will be reduced, and the hydrate formation
prevented. The design philosophy of the inlet cooler unit is thus to guarantee that the liquid flow
remains mixed with MEG, and ensures that the mix is optimally distributed in all the cooling
pipes.
The design philosophy states that no fall-back solution exists, and the inlet cooler unit shall
be built with completely new design. The feasibility of the project as whole is thus partially1
dependent on a successful outcome of the qualification to the inlet cooler unit. Expert judgment
considers the associated risk of insufficient qualification to be low.
A simplified arrangement of the inlet cooler unit is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The figure shows
a passive heat exchanger which primarily consists of:
• A 16" Inlet header (upper) which distributes the fluid to the cooling pipes.
• 42 x 3" 90,4 meter cooling pipes which cool down the fluid.
• 2 x 16" Discharge headers (lower) which collect the fluid from the cooling pipes.
1Also depends on other modules and devices with similar assessment.
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Table 6.2: Functional requirements for inlet cooler unit.
Functional
Parameters Requirements
Design life 25 year s
Design Water Depth 240 - 300 m
Max. internal design pressure 220 bar
Min. internal design pressure 0 bar
Max. internal fluid temperature 110 C ◦
Environmetal temerature 7 C ◦
• Two inlet divides (confidential).
• Protection system (anodes and coating).
• Mechanical supports (pipe support and cooler unit structure).
Functional Requirements
The governing requirements for successful qualification of the ÅSCP are stated in the "Func-
tional design requirements - Åsgard Subsea Compression Project", presented by Statoil. The
document presents qualitative and quantitative statements such as functional requirements,
contractually parameters and limitations for the ÅSCP, including the inlet cooler unit. These
factors are mainly identified as performance, installability, reliability, intervention, availability
targets and similar. Two vital qualitative requirements for the inlet cooler unit are described as:
• Liquid and gas flow mal-distribution should be avoided in the multiphase cooler during
all operating scenarios including turn-down, and this must be verified during the engi-
neering phase.
• Equal distribution of liquid from the cooler inlet header into the separate cooler pipes
shall be secured and documented for the selected cooler design.
Table 6.2 presents examples of some selected quantitative requirements for the inlet cooler
unit. Here both general and operational requirements are present, such as the unit shall be
designed for minimum 25 years of continuous service, without any needs for maintenance or
replacement.
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Figure 6.2: System Breakdown of the inlet cooler unit.
If the technology qualification basis is not fully met, expert judgment may determine whether
to adopt it as it is or alter, in order to satisfy the project.
6.2.2 Technology Assessment
To assess which elements that involve new technology, the inlet cooler unit is broken down into
manageable components and sub-components2 through a Technology Composition Analysis.
Each element is assessed and categorized in a Technology categorization, and relevant chal-
lenges identified in functional uncertainties. The complete assessment is provided in Appendix
B.1, where an extract is shown in Table 6.3. The complete assessment contains some cells that
are marked with an X. This is due to confidential information that has been anonymized.
Technology Composition Analysis
The Technology composition analysis is presented in Figure 6.2. The figure shows a top-down
decomposition assessment that divides the inlet cooler unit into elements. Each element is
identified and numerated to manage the elements through the TQP. This assignment covers the
first two columns of the Technology assessment table.
2Both unit, component and sub-component describes the degradation level to the technology, and is further
described as an element.
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Technology Categorization
In column three relevant functional requirement is identified. This requirement represent the
main purpose of the element. Some elements may have several requirements. The Technology
categorization is based on these requirements. For each functional requirement two different
categorization methods are carried out, the level of technology novelty and TRL.
The level of technology novelty focuses on where the uncertainty to the element is greatest.
The allocation follows the classification presented in table 4.1. The allocation for a particular el-
ement is based on the highest value to the sub-element. Overall, the inlet cooler unit is classified
as 4, indicating demanding new technology challenges.
The TRL indicates to what extent the functional requirement is met, and how the technology
is ready to be used. The allocation is described in table 3.1. The allocation for a particular ele-
ment is based on the lowest value to the sub-element. Overall, the inlet cooler unit is allocated
TRL 1, indicating that the maturity of the technology is low, and extensive qualification work is
required before it may be used.
Functional Uncertainties
The main challenges and uncertainties are also presented in the table. The column represents
which challenge or uncertainty that may cause problem in order to reach the functional re-
quirement. The comments column is created to indicate where the focus should be to provide
sufficient qualification proof.
Summary of Technology Assessment
For technology elements that are classified as 2 or higher, or where TRL<4, there is a need for fur-
ther qualification. Table 6.4 sums up the technology assessment, and highlights the allocations
with unsatisfied values. These elements are categorized as new technology and are included in
the Threat assessment, for further qualification. For the remaining elements sufficient qualify-
ing evidence are available. Traditional engineering shall ensure that this evidence is followed.
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Table 6.4: Technology assessment summary.
Classifi- Further
Element cation TRL qualification Comment
1 Inlet cooler unit 4 1 Yes Due to sub-element
1.1 Anodes 1 7 No
1.1.1 Anode 1 7 No
1.2 Headers 4 2 Yes Due to sub-element
1.2.1 Inlet header 4 2 Yes TCla> 1, TRL≤ 3
1.2.2 Discharge header 3 5 Yes TCl> 1,
1.3 Heat exchange piping 3 3 Yes Due to sub-element
1.3.1 Pipes 3 3 Yes TCl> 1, TRL≤ 3
1.3.2 Coating 2 5 Yes TCl> 1,
1.4 Mechanical supports 4 3 Yes Due to sub-element
1.4.1 Pipe supports 4 3 Yes TCl> 1, TRL≤ 3
1.4.2 Cooler unit structure 1 7 No
1.5 Inlet devices 4 1 Yes Due to sub-element
1.5.1 Inlet device 1 4 2 Yes TCl> 1, TRL≤ 3
1.5.2 Inlet device 2 4 1 Yes TCl> 1, TRL≤ 3
aTCl = Technology Classification
6.2.3 Threat Assessment
For those elements in the inlet cooler unit that was categorized as new technology, relevant
failure modes with associated mechanisms are identified and evaluated. A modified FMECA
type methodology was selected to carry out this assessment. The method involves a spread
sheet where each element on the lowest level represents a row. Each row is divided into dif-
ferentcolumns that describe the element and associated failure. The complete FMECA sheet is
provided in Appendix B.2, where an extract is shown in Table 6.5. The FMECA also includes the
elements that strictly speaking did not need to be there, but has been included due to traditional
engineering. The table contains some cells that are marked with an X. This is due to confidential
information that has been anonymized.
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Description of Element and Failure
The first two columns identify the item and associated failure mode (FM). The main function
of the element introduces all functions that the element may have through the life cycle. The
operational mode points out the operation phase of the function. Most of the functions are pre-
sented in normal mode, indicating that the inlet cooler unit cools down the multiphase flow. For
each function and associated operational mode failure mode and failure cause/mechanism is
identified through brainstorming by the expert group. The failure mode is related to the corre-
sponding main function of the element, where the mode defines a non-fulfillment of the func-
tion. The root cause of the failure is described in the failure cause or mechanism column. The
column describes which actions that produces or contributes to the failure mode. In addition,
a column identifies the various possibilities for detecting a failure.
Risk Ranking
Each failure to the inlet cooler unit is considered in a risk ranking. The frequency of a specific
failure is estimated by the expert group assign conservation estimate. The frequencies are based
on a suitable frequency categorization, presented in Table 4.2. The consequence of a failure is
also identified, where the expert group studied one-by-one failure and assigned a severity level.
The suitable consequence classes described in Table 4.3 was used. The risk matrix presented in
Figure 4.2 combines the consequence with the frequency, and assigns a criticality to the failure.
In addition, each failure has been assigned a comment and an action item column. These
provide additional information and actions that should be implemented to reduce the risk to
the failure.
Summary of Threat Assessment
A summary of the failures are presented in Figure 6.3. A total of 26 failure modes was detected,
where 24 was further considered, due to the categorization of new technology. A total of 5 high,
9 medium and 3 low risk elements were identified, in addition to 7 failure scenarios that was
unranked. One of these seven was assessed to be high risk, but without specific consequence
and frequency. The other six are intended to be inputs to the design and operation, and are
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Figure 6.3: Failure scenario summary - Inlet cooler unit.
hereby considered to be low. Totally, there are 15 failure scenarios3 with unacceptable risk4, and
considered as critical. These failures shall further be covered by the technology qualification
plan. The rest of the failure scenarios, related to low risk, is concluded based on qualitative
assessment by the expert group. The critical uncertainties can mainly be divided into four areas:
• Hydrate formation due to insufficient liquid distribution or where the amount of MEG in
the production flow is insufficient.
• Fail to maintain cooling capacity throughout the intended lifetime.
• Rupture in welds due to vibrations.
• Combination of damaged coating and malfunction of cathodic protection can cause ex-
cessive corrosion.
6.2.4 Qualification Plan
The aim of the Qualification Plan is to develop a strategy where desired TRL and classification
are met for the inlet cooler unit. This is managed by reducing the uncertainties and provided
sufficient documentation to those failure modes of concern.
The technology qualification plan is organized into a milestone plan, shown in Figure 6.4,
with four separated verification activities, where each activity is created to manage one or more
314 from the risk matrix and 1 unranked. Applies to: b1, b3, b5, c1, c3, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, e1, e2, f1, h2, i1
4Failure with medium and high risk
48 CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY
Activity
A
B
C
D
Time
Qualification plan
end
Qualification plan
start
Figure 6.4: Milestone plan for execution of activities.
of the fifteen failure scenarios with critical uncertainties identified in the Threat assessment.
The activities are:
A ) Liquid distribution verification
B ) Heat transfer capacity verification
C ) Mechanical rupture of critical weld verification
D ) Pipe support corrosion resistance verification
Unless these verification activities do not provide sufficient evidence, new activities shall be
developed in order to secure enough evidence.
A ) Liquid Distribution Verification
The activity shall prove that the final design distributes sufficient liquid properly to all cooling
pipes. This includes multiple elements, mainly the Inlet header (1.2.1) and the Inlet device 1
(1.5.1) and Inlet device 2 (1.5.2). The activity covers the critical failures b1/b3/h2/i1. Several of
these can cause vital feature failure, making this activity a priority, with high time consumption.
The verification activity is a twofold activity where CFD are combined and compared with
results from a conservative physical test. The CFD model is validated by comparing results from
the physical tests with the CFD model at low pressure. When the CFD model corresponds to the
physical test, the model shall verify a high-pressure scenario. Such scenarios are impossible to
verify by tests. However, the low pressure test is regarded as the most critical scenario, since the
separation ability increases with reduced pressure.
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The physical test is conductet by a scaled-down rig at near by ambient pressur. The flow
regime in the test is expected to correspond to the flow regime in the final inlet cooler unit.
By testing different liquid content and flow rates, observations can be used to predict the real
operation condition.
A more detailed description of the test is not given, due to the scope of the test. Specified
requirements stated in the technology basis shall be followed through the testing. The activity
is considered as verified when expected distribution of different liquid content and flow rates
meets stated requirements
B ) Heat Transfer Capacity Verification
The objective of this activity is to ensure that Inlet Cooler unite meets the heat transfer capac-
ity requirements. More specific, the activity provides evidence for the critical failure modes,
d1/d2/d3, to the Pipe (1.3.1).
The verification is based on empirical correlation models where CFD simulations and calcu-
lations are carried out. This comprises calculation of overall heat transfer coefficient (OHTC) by
both the CFD method and the applicable empirical correlation models method. More advanced
full scale testing are assumed not necessary, since the current uncertainty level is considered as
low as reasonably practicable. Instead, similarities to the inlet cooler unit on Ormen Lange Pilot
may be used for further uncertainty reduction.
The activity is considered as verified if the results from both CFD and empirical correlation
models are reasonably comparable within the process requirements.
C ) Mechanical Rupture of Critical Weld Verification
The risk of mechanical rupture in critical welds is reduced through design verification using
FEM analysis. The activity provides evidenc for critical failures identified in the inlet header
(1.2.1), discharge header (1.2.2) and pipes (1.3.1), respectively b5, c3 and d4.
The FEM analysis shall provide feedback to design optimisation. Test welding shall be car-
ried out on equipment with similar dimension, where x-ray technology will evaluated and verify
the weld method. A verified weld will withstand mechanical failures and vibrations.
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D ) Pipe Support Corrosion Resistance Verification
The aim of the last verification activity is to ensure that the boundary between the pipes and
pipe support is not exposed to excessive corrosion. The activity provides evidence for the critical
failure f1 in the pipe supports (1.4.1).
The verification activity is a twofold activity, where the first evaluates the coverage to the ca-
thodic protection system. This individual verification shall be done using established computer
modelling and simulation tools. The second activity evaluates the potential for excessively high
temperatures in the boundary between the pipes and pipe support. The verification is based on
participation of specialists from relevant discipline.
The total activity is verified if the cathodic protection system covers sufficiently, and no high
temperature in the boundary is found. In such cases the uncertainties is reduced due to the
local corrosion is ruled out.
Verification of the remaining critical failures
In addition to the critical failures that are covered by the verification activities, four failures are
not directly covered. These applies c1, d5, e1 and e2.
For the failures c1 and d5, no directly activities will be provided to avoid hydrate formation.
As described in the technology assessment, to secure the flow rate in the pipes or collecting the
flow from the pipes are well known technology, A hydrate formation will only occur when the
inlet header fails to distribution sufficient. Verification of activity A will thus ensures that failure
c1 and d5 is also verified.
Failures e1 and e2 deals with coating of the inlet cooler unit. These failure issues is managed
by following TR0042 (Surface preparation and protective coating) and NORSOK M-501 (Surface
preparation and protective coating). Additional experience should be transferred from Ormen
Lange.
6.2.5 Execution of the Plan
All the verification activities identified in the qualification plan are carried out in the execution
of the plan. The starting point and the length of each activity follow the milestone plan, illus-
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trated in Figure 6.4.
Throughout the execution of the plan, the documentation of the qualification is essential to
ensure traceability and evidence to the technology. The execution of an activity shall allways
follow stated requirements.
6.2.6 Performance Assessment
In the performance assessment, the documented qualification evidence, obtained trough the
execution of the plan, shall be compared with the technology- and requirement specifications
stated in the technology qualification basis.
In this case study, real qualification evidence were difficult to obtain so no qualification con-
clusions are drawn. If qualification evidence had been available, these would have been ana-
lyzed and compared with the governing document "Functional design requirements - Åsgard
Subsea Compression Project", presented by Statoil. The technology would have been consid-
ered as qualified when the qualification evidence meets all requirements. In cases where the
technology does not meet the requirement, a modification loop could be used for trying to meet
the requirements.
Projects with higher extent addition parameters may be examined to ensure that the tech-
nology meets all requirements. One of these parameters may be availability. In the Åsgard
project, only availability requirements on an general level are stated, and not on sub-levels.
This is due to the availability of sub-levels are rarely of interest, as it only represent a fraction
of the total availability. The total availability is based on the availability of all sub-level. Chapter
7 provides availability measure of the inlet cooler unit.
After successful completion of the qualification, a qualification report shall be developed.
This document shall provide evidence of the qualification, based on the documentation gath-
ered through the TQP. The document shall be preceded by a summary of the qualification, where
responsible manager provides approval.
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Chapter 7
RAM model
A production assurance analysis provides valuable insight about the operational performance to
all industries within production, processing and transportation (ISO 20815, 2010). This can sub-
sequently be used to estimate income and to determine the profitability. Another, and widely
used name for this analysis is RAM analysis.
A RAM analysis is a network study, where available equipment, production capability, and
maintenance requirements are calculated. For complex systems, such calculations may be very
complicated. For this reason appropriate software tools have been developed, such as MIRIAM
Regina that is commonly used in the Norwegian oil and gas industry. MIRIAM Regina is devel-
oped in close cooperation with Norwegian oil companies (Statoil), and is used to verify devel-
opment options for the Norwegian continental shelf. The calculations in MIRIAM Regina are
based on a logic network where probability distributions are used as input to simulations in or-
der to estimate the operational performance. The logic network must be modulated in such a
way that it represents a physical system.
MIRIAM Regina is used to estimate the technical availability of the Inlet Cooler Unit in this
case study. The estimated values presented in this chapter are not directly used as inputs to the
performance assessment. This is because there is not stated any specific technical availability
requirements for sub-system1, only for the system as a whole2. The inlet cooler RAM model
presented here can further be used as input to availability calculations for the whole system.
1Unit, Component, Sub-Component, ect.
2Åsgard Subsea Compression Project (ÅSCP)
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Figure 7.1: Inlet cooler unit modulated in MIRIAM Regina.
7.1 Building the model
An appropriate network for the inlet cooler unit was modeled in MIRIAM Regina. The network,
which is shown in Figure 7.1, has two boundary points and five process stages. The boundary
points, presented as triangles (entry and discharge), are the edges of the system. The process
stages are presented as rectangles. Each process stage represent one of the five main compo-
nents in Figure 6.2. For each process stage the associated failure modes are presented as items.
These failure modes, associated with the sub-components, are not visualized in the network.
Overall, the network can be regarded as failures modes combined in series.
A flow is used to visualize the production performance to the inlet cooler unit. The flow en-
ters and leaves the system though the boundary points. In our context the flow rate can be seen
as the availability of the system studied, where the entry boundary point is stated with 100%
availability. Through the process, the technical availability is reduced by the random events ini-
tiated by the items in each process stage. The end boundary point may thus indicate a lower
availability than the start, and represent the final performance of the system.
The magnitude of the reduction is determined by the failure rates of the failure modes in
combination with their repair time. Due to testing, maintenance, and replacement policies3,
the failure rate in the burn-in and the wear-out periods of the bath-tube curve is ignored. The
failure rates are then considered to be constant (Z (t ) = ZC (t )) where all failures will occur in
the useful life period of the bath-tube function. Consequently, the failure rate is exponentially
distributed. Required parameter for exponentially distributed is mean failure.
3Preventive maintenance activities in form of planned maintenance is not planned. Only condition based main-
tenance is continuously performed in terms of tests, measurements and observations with ROV
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Figure 7.2: System restoration time.
The mean failure parameters are mainly obtained from the reliability database, OREDA4.
OREDA is an extensive failure data source developed to predict the performance of systems in
subsea and topside environments. The data given in OREDA describes already qualified equip-
ment, where uncertainty is reduced and documented. The availability calculations to the inlet
cooler unit are thus based on a system where the uncertainty is reduced. Since the inlet cooler
unit technology is new, OREDA does not have data for identical equipment. The used data is
thus obtained from similar equipment. In cases with lack of similar equipment, or where the
similarities are considered too small, estimations from the FMECA work sheet are applied. The
conservative end of range is used for all failure rates except B3, where the optimistic end of the
frequency range is used based on expert judgment.
The applied data is presented in Table 7.1. The failure modes are obtained from the FMECA
work sheet, modified and combined in order to avoid duplication of failure rates. The item col-
umn identifies the overall failure mode, while the FM id indicates which failure modes are com-
bined. Several failure modes are omitted5, due to no relevance to the availability calculation.
The associated failure rates obtained from OREDA are shown in the first failure rate column.
The second column gives the failure rate obtained from the FMECA work sheet. The final fail-
ure rate column shows a conversion of the first two columns in the way it is plotted in MIRIAM
Regina. The source of the data is given in the comment column.
The item restoration duration is understood as the duration from an occurrence of the failure
mode, up to the restoration of normal operation. Figure 7.2 illustrates relevant time elements
that are considered for each item. Some of the time elements are dependent on seasonal varia-
4The OREDA (Offshore Reliability Data) is one of the most reliability data source for offshore and onshore use.
5non critical failures or non relevant operational mode
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tions, and are marked by summer (S) and winter (W). All the item restoration duration elements
are considered to be constant. In MIRIAM Regina, the mean down time (MDT ) is composed6 of
run-down time (TRD ), mean time to repair (MT T R) and ramp-up time (TRU ). The mobilization
time (TM ) is implemented separately, since each item may require different resources with dif-
ferent durations. The MT T R is in this context regarded as the time it takes to replace a module
with a spare module7. For this reason, all the various parameters are allocated the same values
for each failure mode, as all failures requires a replaced module.
The time it takes to restore a failed item to it’s original state, is denoted main time to re-
pair failure (MT T RF ). The time parameter includes all aspects from transporting the module
on-shore, to the specific failure on the module is fixed. In MIRIAM Regina, this is modeled by
repairing individual sub-components. Due to lack of estimates, MT T RF is considered to be
constant 30 days for all failures, based on expert judgment.
Due to time limitation in this assignment, it is assumed that all the failures included in the
RAM model lead to 100% loss of function, and that common cause failures do not occur.
7.2 Validation and Simulation
The model has been validated through meetings with Aker Solutions reliability and cooler en-
gineers, as well as MIRIAM Regina validated the module, with successful outcome. The simu-
lation was specified with a 25-year perspective (219000 hours), since this is the duration Statoil
has determined that the compression system shall operate. The tolerance calculation was set to
0,001. This indicates that the results are rounded to three decimals when this is required. The
simulation was carried out with 1000 replications, in order to obtain reliable answers.
7.3 Results
The average technical availability (Asi m) for the inlet cooler unit was found to be 98,93%, giv-
ing a production unavailability of 1,07%. The overall technical availability is relatively high, due
6MDT = TRD +MT T R+TRU
7Since both compression trains can request only one spare module, will this calculation differ slightly with the
reality
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Figure 7.3: Variability distribution for 1000 simulation replications.
to effective modularization (i.e., the cooler module is separately retrievable) and effective spare
philosophy. Figure 7.3 illustrates how the availability is distributed for 1000 simulation replica-
tions.
The output from the simulation is presented in Table 7.2. The simulation predicts the mo-
bilizations frequency of the subsea processing intervention vessel (SPIV) to be 6,3 times during
the 25 years of operational lifetime. This gives an annual SPIV mobilization of 0,25 times. The
total average duration of repair with SPIV is found to be 1586 hours, such that the annual dura-
tion is 63,4 hours. The sub-components that represent the most frequent failures are the Inlet
header (due to failure mode id B2) and the Pipes (due to failure mode id D1), where interven-
tional intervals (TI I ) are estimated to be 9.3 years and 9,0 years, respectively. This predominant
trend may have been predicted, partly since their failure rate (number of failures per time unit)
is low and due to the simplicity of the model. The estimated intervention interval for the inlet
cooler unit as a whole is 4,0 years.
7.4 Performance Assessment, TQP
Specific availability requirements are, as previously mention, not stated for the inlet cooler unit.
However, if a possible technical availability requirement (Abasi s) had been stated to 98,5% in the
technology basis, the simulated values to inlet cooler unit could have been used as evidence in
the Performance Assessment. In this case, the inlet cooler unit would have been considered as
qualified, due to Abasi s < Asi m .
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Chapter 8
Summary and Recommendations for
Further Work
So far in this thesis, technology qualification has been described in a general term and more sub-
sea specific term. This final chapter summarizes the various sections in the thesis and briefly
introduces the obtained results based on the objectives. Finally, some recommendations of pos-
sible extension for further work is given based on the findings through this master thesis.
8.1 Summary and Conclusions
Implementing new subsea technology involves significant financial expenses and uncertainties
related to the technology. The uncertainty implies a risk that should be managed and reduced
to an acceptable level, prior to implementation.
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, relevant definitions related to qualification have been presented.
Understanding similarities and differences of these definitions is essential for further under-
standing of qualification. Three different qualification methods have been introduced, analyti-
cal qualification, qualification by testing, and a combined integrated qualification.
In Chapter 3, an in-depth literature survey was documented, where relevant standards and
governing documentation were presented. General qualification documents have been ana-
lyzed and the TQP from DNV-RP-A203 was briefly introduced. TQPs for two Norwegian offshore
companies, the oil operator Statoil and the technology provider Aker Solutions, have been an-
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alyzed and their implementation of general qualification documents were described. Relevant
standards for qualification of SIS were also introduced, along with various supplementary stan-
dards.
A more detailed description of the technology qualification process related to the TQP in
DNV-RP-A203 was described in Chapter 4. This process was updated in 2011, given improved
and more logical qualification flow, resulting in improved usability. The new technology quali-
fication process is currently considered as state of the art by the oil industry. The process con-
sists of six systematic steps that reduces uncertainty and provide evidence for the qualification.
These are, technology qualification basis, technology assessment, treat assessment, technology
qualification plan, execution of the plan, and performance assessment.
Governing documents in major subsea projects, have been presented in Chapter 5. In ma-
jor projects, several players are often represented, and each of them has different guidelines
for qualification. The chapter has discussed the relationship between these procedures, more
specifically for Aker Solutions, Statoil, and the overall qualification document DNV-RP-A203.
Various implementation strategies for TPQ were also presented in Chapter 5.
Further, in Chapter 6, an extensive qualification case study was performed. The aim of the
case was to describe and carry out a qualification through the technology qualification process
provided in DNV-RP-A203. A new subsea inlet cooler unit was chosen as the case equipment.
The heat exchanger technology is well known within topside production systems, but for SPS
the technology is new. Basic qualification requirements were identified in the technology quali-
fication basis. Maturity of the technology has been analyzed in the technology assessment, and
critical failure modes identified in the threat assessment. For those failure scenarios with an un-
acceptable risk, four verification activities were designed in the technology qualification plan.
The aim of each activity was to reduce the uncertainty to the critical failures. The qualifica-
tion plan was further carried out by execution of the technology qualification plan. Verification
results were collected and documented. The last step concerns the performance assessment.
Here, the verification values were compared with qualification requirements stated in the tech-
nology qualification basis. If the requirements had been met, then the values could have been
used as evidence of qualification. Due to insufficient material, the last process step was inade-
quately reached.
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An extension of the case study was carried out in Chapter 7. The chapter presented a produc-
tion assurance analysis of the inlet cooler unit. The analysis was carried out using the simulation
software MIRIAM Regina. A suitable failure mode model was applied based on a decomposition
of the inlet cooler unit. The model was constructed with different parameters such as failure
rates and restoration times, and was validated by representatives of Aker Solutions. The simula-
tion was carried out with 25 years perspective, through 1000 replications. The result shows that
the average technical availability (Asi m) for the inlet cooler unit was found to be 98,93%. Since
no availability requirements exist for the inlet cooler, the chapter does not conclude whether the
technical availability is sufficiently high to be qualified, or not. Instead, it indicates that avail-
ability requirements (Abasi s) stated in the technology qualification basis, must be Abasi s < Asi m
in order to considered the inlet cooler unit as qualified.
8.2 Discussion
The main conclusion and key finding from this master thesis were that technology qualification
is an important step prior to implementation of all new technology. A qualification should be
conducted with a TQP, which represents the framework for the qualification. Within the TQP a
technology qualification process should be implemented. The process identifies the necessary
qualification, and seeks to reduce the risks and uncertainty associated with the technology. A
technology is considered as qualified when specified requirements are met, ensuring safe and
more reliable technology to health and environment.
8.3 Recommendations for Further Work
For recommendations to further work, the author suggests revising the presented business-
specific documents to ensure that the new and more user-friendly technology qualification pro-
cess presented in the 2011 issue of DNV-RP-A203 is followed. Another recommendation is to
develop a more detailed flowchart of the qualification process, to ensure better overview of the
activities within each process step. In addition, qualification templates should be developed for
all mandatory documents through the TQP. This provides both time and cost savings through
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the qualification.
Appendix A
Acronyms
CFD Computational fluid dynamics
DG Decision gate
E/E/PE Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic
FEM finite element
FM Failure mode
FMA Failure mode assessment
IDC Inter discipline check
MEG Mono-ethylene glycol
PEM Project execution model
PQS Product qualification sheet
RAM Reliability, availability, maintainability
RP Recommended practice
SIL Safety integrity level
SIS Safety instrumented systems
SPS Subsea production systems
TCl Technology classification
TRL Technology readiness level
TQP Technology qualification program/procedure
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66 APPENDIX A. ACRONYMS
ÅSCP Åsgard Subsea Compression Project
Appendix B
CASE, Technology qualification
B.1 - Technology Assessment
B.2 - Threat Assessment
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1
P
ro
ce
ss
d
es
ig
n
li
m
it
s
to
p
re
ve
n
te
xc
es
si
ve
p
re
ss
u
re
E
xt
en
si
ve
fi
el
d
h
is
to
ry
lo
ss
an
d
er
o
si
o
n
A
co
u
st
ic
ge
n
er
at
ed
b
y
fl
ow
sp
ec
ia
lly
in
th
e
h
ea
d
er
te
es
sh
al
lb
e
ev
al
u
at
ed
.
Se
cu
re
m
at
er
ia
ls
u
it
ab
il
it
y
fo
r
th
e
M
at
er
ia
ls
el
ec
ti
o
n
3
5
N
O
R
SO
K
M
-6
50
Q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
o
fm
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
rs
p
u
rp
o
se
an
d
co
m
p
at
ib
il
it
y
w
it
h
o
fs
p
ec
ia
lm
at
er
ia
ls
se
aw
at
er
an
d
p
ro
d
u
ce
d
/i
n
je
ct
ed
So
m
e
fi
el
d
h
is
to
ry
to
p
si
d
e.
fl
u
id
s
Sy
st
em
in
te
gr
at
ed
in
O
rm
en
La
n
ge
P
il
o
t.
6M
o
is
se
le
ct
ed
to
av
o
id
H
IS
C
re
la
te
d
co
n
ce
rn
s.
1.
2.
1
In
le
th
ea
d
er
M
in
im
is
e
liq
u
id
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
2-
p
h
as
e
fl
u
id
d
yn
am
ic
s
-
li
q
u
id
4
2
C
F
D
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
s
in
Å
sg
ar
d
p
ro
je
ct
.
va
ri
an
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
co
o
li
n
g
p
ip
es
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
T
h
e
se
le
ct
ed
d
es
ig
n
is
b
as
ed
o
n
te
st
s
an
d
re
d
es
ig
n
.
1.
2.
2
D
is
ch
ar
ge
C
o
lle
ct
th
e
m
u
lt
ip
h
as
e
fl
ow
fr
o
m
B
as
ic
fl
u
id
m
ec
h
an
ic
s
an
d
m
an
if
o
ld
1
7
E
xt
en
si
ve
fi
el
d
h
is
to
ry
.
h
ea
d
er
al
lc
o
o
lin
g
p
ip
es
an
d
ro
u
te
it
to
th
e
d
es
ig
n
.
co
o
le
r
d
is
ch
ar
ge
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
tp
ag
e
B.1. CASE, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 69
Ta
b
le
B
.1
–
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
vi
o
u
s
p
ag
e
E
l.
ID
E
le
m
en
tn
am
e
Fu
n
ct
io
n
al
R
eq
u
ir
em
en
ts
C
h
al
le
n
ge
s/
U
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ti
es
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
C
u
rr
en
tT
R
L
C
o
m
m
en
ts
1.
2.
2
D
is
ch
ar
ge
Se
cu
re
co
n
st
ru
ct
ab
il
it
y
Fa
b
ri
ca
ti
o
n
(c
u
tt
in
g,
m
ac
h
in
in
g,
3
5
R
el
at
iv
el
y
si
m
il
ar
d
es
ig
n
as
O
rm
en
La
n
ge
h
ea
d
er
w
el
d
in
g)
Fo
cu
s
o
n
ri
sk
o
fd
is
to
rt
io
n
,r
is
ks
to
b
e
as
se
ss
ed
an
d
m
an
ag
ed
(F
M
E
C
A
).
1.
3
H
ea
tE
xc
h
an
ge
p
ip
in
g
3
3
1.
3.
1
P
ip
es
M
ai
n
ta
in
h
ea
tc
o
n
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
w
it
h
in
Sc
al
e
m
an
ag
em
en
t-
ca
lc
ar
eo
u
s
2
4
B
as
ed
o
n
Se
aw
at
er
sa
m
p
li
n
g
an
d
an
al
ys
is
fo
r
th
e
ex
p
ec
te
d
li
m
it
s
th
ro
u
gh
o
u
tt
h
e
d
ep
o
si
ta
n
d
b
io
fo
u
lin
g
ev
al
u
at
io
n
o
fs
ca
le
p
o
te
n
ti
al
.
in
te
n
d
ed
lif
et
im
e
N
o
tp
o
ss
ib
le
to
te
st
an
d
ve
ri
fy
in
ad
va
n
ce
.
U
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
n
ee
d
s
to
b
e
ac
ce
p
te
d
an
d
m
it
ig
at
in
g
ac
ti
o
n
s
in
it
ia
te
d
.
Se
cu
re
fl
ow
ra
te
w
it
h
in
ac
ce
p
ta
b
le
Li
n
e
si
zi
n
g
1
7
N
O
R
SO
K
P-
00
1
P
ro
ce
ss
d
es
ig
n
li
m
it
s
to
p
re
ve
n
te
xc
es
si
ve
p
re
ss
u
re
E
xt
en
si
ve
fi
el
d
h
is
to
ry
.
lo
ss
an
d
er
o
si
o
n
A
co
u
st
ic
ge
n
er
at
ed
b
y
fl
ow
,s
h
al
lb
e
ev
al
u
at
ed
Se
cu
re
m
at
er
ia
ls
u
it
ab
il
it
y
fo
r
th
e
M
at
er
ia
ls
el
ec
ti
o
n
3
5
So
m
e
fi
el
d
h
is
to
ry
o
f6
M
o
u
se
in
to
p
si
d
e
eq
u
ip
m
en
t.
p
u
rp
o
se
an
d
co
m
p
at
ib
il
it
y
w
it
h
N
O
R
SO
K
M
-6
50
Q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
o
fm
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
rs
se
aw
at
er
an
d
p
ro
d
u
ce
d
/i
n
je
ct
ed
o
fs
p
ec
ia
lm
at
er
ia
ls
.
fl
u
id
s
Sy
st
em
in
te
gr
at
ed
in
O
rm
en
La
n
ge
P
il
o
t.
3"
Sc
h
80
p
ip
es
se
le
ct
ed
fo
r
Å
sg
ar
d
ar
e
co
n
si
d
er
ed
m
o
re
ro
b
u
st
th
an
O
rm
en
La
n
ge
P
il
o
t1
1 ⁄ 2
"
6M
o
is
se
le
ct
ed
to
av
o
id
H
IS
C
re
la
te
d
co
n
ce
rn
s.
Se
cu
re
co
n
st
ru
ct
ab
il
it
y
Fa
b
ri
ca
ti
o
n
(c
u
tt
in
g,
m
ac
h
in
in
g,
1
7
E
xt
en
si
ve
fi
el
d
h
is
to
ry
.
w
el
d
in
g)
D
im
en
si
o
n
al
to
le
ra
n
ce
re
q
u
ir
es
sp
ec
ia
lf
o
cu
s.
Se
cu
re
th
at
ac
tu
al
h
ea
tt
ra
n
sf
er
T
h
er
m
o
d
yn
am
ic
s
,n
at
u
ra
l
2
3
E
vi
d
en
ce
th
ro
u
gh
te
st
s
ca
p
ac
it
y
m
ee
ts
th
e
re
q
u
ir
em
en
t
co
n
ve
ct
io
n
,C
F
D
C
F
D
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
s
in
Å
sg
ar
d
p
ro
je
ct
,r
ep
o
rt
in
ID
C
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
tp
ag
e
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Ta
b
le
B
.1
–
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
vi
o
u
s
p
ag
e
E
l.
ID
E
le
m
en
tn
am
e
Fu
n
ct
io
n
al
R
eq
u
ir
em
en
ts
C
h
al
le
n
ge
s/
U
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ti
es
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
C
u
rr
en
tT
R
L
C
o
m
m
en
ts
1.
3.
2
C
o
at
in
g
R
ed
u
ce
th
e
am
o
u
n
to
fa
n
o
d
es
C
o
at
in
g
m
at
er
ia
ls
,s
u
rf
ac
e
2
5
T
R
00
42
Su
rf
ac
e
p
re
p
ar
at
io
n
an
d
p
ro
te
ct
iv
e
co
at
in
g
n
ee
d
ed
.
p
re
p
ar
at
io
n
,a
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s
N
O
R
SO
K
M
-5
01
Su
rf
ac
e
p
re
p
ar
at
io
n
an
d
p
ro
te
ct
iv
e
an
d
in
sp
ec
ti
o
n
co
at
in
g
E
xt
en
si
ve
fi
el
d
h
is
to
ry
.
Pa
in
ti
n
g
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
sh
o
u
ld
b
e
tr
an
sf
er
re
d
fr
o
m
O
rm
en
La
n
ge
.
B
o
th
m
in
im
u
m
an
d
m
ax
im
u
m
co
at
in
g
th
ic
kn
es
s
re
q
u
ir
em
en
ts
.
1.
4
M
ec
h
an
ic
al
su
p
p
o
rt
4
3
1.
4.
1
P
ip
e
su
p
p
o
rt
P
ro
vi
d
e
m
ec
h
an
ic
al
su
p
p
o
rt
to
p
ip
es
So
li
d
m
ec
h
an
ic
s
-
p
ip
in
g
1
7
E
xt
en
si
ve
fi
el
d
h
is
to
ry
.
se
cu
ri
n
g
n
ec
es
sa
ry
ro
b
u
st
n
es
s
an
d
F
E
M
sh
o
u
ld
ve
ri
fy
ef
fe
ct
s
o
fv
ib
ra
ti
o
n
s.
fl
ex
ib
il
it
y
Se
cu
re
su
it
ab
il
it
y
fo
rt
h
e
p
u
rp
o
se
an
d
M
at
er
ia
ls
4
3
E
xt
en
si
ve
to
p
si
d
e
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
,l
ac
ki
n
g
fo
r
su
b
se
a.
co
m
p
at
ib
ili
ty
w
it
h
p
ip
e
m
at
er
ia
la
n
d
M
ai
n
co
n
ce
rn
is
co
rr
o
si
o
n
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
su
p
p
o
rt
an
d
st
ru
ct
u
ra
lm
at
er
ia
l
th
e
p
ip
e.
Se
cu
re
co
n
st
ru
ct
ab
il
it
y
Fa
b
ri
ca
ti
o
n
(c
u
tt
in
g,
m
ac
h
in
in
g,
1
7
E
xt
en
si
ve
fi
el
d
h
is
to
ry
w
el
d
in
g)
1.
4.
2
C
o
o
le
r
u
n
it
P
ro
vi
d
e
m
ec
h
an
ic
al
su
p
p
o
rt
to
p
ip
e
So
li
d
m
ec
h
an
ic
s
-
st
ru
ct
u
re
s
1
7
E
xt
en
si
ve
fi
el
d
h
is
to
ry
st
ru
ct
u
re
su
p
p
o
rt
s
an
d
fa
ci
li
ta
te
tr
an
sp
o
rt
an
d
h
an
d
li
n
g
1.
5
In
le
td
ev
ic
es
4
1
1.
5.
1
In
le
td
ev
ic
e
1
X
X
4
2
C
F
D
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
s
in
Å
sg
ar
d
p
ro
je
ct
,r
ep
o
rt
in
ID
C
.
X
Se
cu
re
co
n
st
ru
ct
ab
il
it
y
Fa
b
ri
ca
ti
o
n
(c
u
tt
in
g,
m
ac
h
in
in
g,
1
4
R
el
ev
an
tc
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
es
ar
e
p
ro
ve
n
,
w
el
d
in
g)
h
ow
ev
er
in
d
if
fe
re
n
td
es
ig
n
s
1.
5.
2
In
le
td
ev
ic
e
2
X
X
4
1
C
F
D
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
s
in
Å
sg
ar
d
p
ro
je
ct
.
X
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B
.2
C
A
SE
,T
h
re
at
A
ss
es
sm
en
t
Ta
b
le
B
.2
:F
M
E
C
A
sh
ee
t.
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
o
fe
le
m
en
t
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
o
ff
ai
lu
re
R
is
k
ra
n
ki
n
g
E
l-
(F
M
)
ID
E
le
m
en
t
N
am
e
M
ai
n
fu
n
ct
io
n
o
f
el
em
en
t
O
p
er
at
io
n
al
M
o
d
e
Fa
il
u
re
m
o
d
e
Fa
il
u
re
ca
u
se
o
r
m
ec
h
an
is
m
D
et
ec
ti
o
n
o
f
fa
il
u
re
Con
Freq
Crit
C
o
m
m
en
ts
A
ct
io
n
It
em
1.
1.
1
A
n
o
d
e
P
ro
vi
d
e
ca
th
o
d
ic
N
o
rm
al
C
o
rr
o
si
o
n
In
su
ffi
ci
en
tc
at
h
o
d
ic
H
C
le
ak
ag
e,
4
C
M
If
co
at
in
g
is
d
am
ag
ed
lo
ca
lc
o
rr
o
si
o
n
m
ig
h
t
a.
D
es
ig
n
ve
ri
fi
ca
ti
o
n
b
y
th
ir
d
p
ar
ty
u
si
n
g
(a
1)
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
to
th
e
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
(c
u
rr
en
t
P
re
ss
u
re
d
ev
el
o
p
q
u
ic
kl
y
o
n
ce
st
ar
te
d
.
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
.
su
b
se
a
eq
u
ip
m
en
t.
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
)
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
,
b.
In
cl
u
d
e
in
R
O
V
in
sp
ec
ti
o
n
in
st
ru
ct
io
n
s.
an
d
R
O
V
c.
E
va
lu
at
e
if
H
C
le
ak
ag
e
d
et
ec
ti
o
n
co
ve
rs
in
sp
ec
ti
o
n
.
co
o
le
rs
.
1.
2.
1
In
le
t
Se
cu
re
fl
ow
ra
te
N
o
rm
al
C
lo
gg
ed
H
yd
ra
te
fo
rm
at
io
n
D
P
/D
T
an
d
4
B
M
Ve
ry
u
n
li
ke
ly
to
o
cc
u
r
b
ef
o
re
h
yd
ra
te
s
h
av
e
a.
A
ss
es
s
su
ffi
ci
en
ta
m
o
u
n
t/
q
u
al
it
y
(s
al
t
(b
1)
h
ea
d
er
w
it
h
in
ac
ce
p
ta
b
le
li
q
u
id
co
n
te
n
t
cl
o
gg
ed
th
e
co
o
li
n
g
p
ip
es
.
co
n
te
n
tc
o
n
ce
rn
s)
o
fM
E
G
.
li
m
it
s
an
d
d
is
tr
ib
u
te
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t.
O
cc
u
re
s
b
y
la
ck
o
fM
E
G
.
li
q
u
id
to
al
lc
o
o
li
n
g
p
ip
es
.
(b
2)
Sa
n
d
ac
cu
m
u
la
ti
o
n
D
P
1
C
L
Ve
ry
u
n
li
ke
ly
to
o
cc
u
r,
si
n
ce
th
e
sa
n
d
w
ill
fo
llo
w
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t.
th
e
ga
s.
(b
3)
P
ip
es
To
o
u
n
ev
en
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
D
P
/D
T
4
E
H
C
F
D
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
s
in
Å
sg
ar
d
p
ro
je
ct
.
a.
M
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
an
d
o
p
er
at
io
n
al
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
.
u
n
in
h
ib
it
ed
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t.
T
h
e
se
le
ct
ed
d
es
ig
n
is
b
as
ed
o
n
te
st
s
an
d
re
d
es
ig
n
.
b.
Li
q
u
id
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
an
d
te
st
in
g.
(b
4)
In
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
H
C
a.
In
p
u
tt
o
o
p
er
at
io
n
al
m
an
u
al
.
ac
cu
m
u
la
ti
o
n
(b
5)
M
ec
h
an
ic
al
N
o
rm
al
E
xt
er
n
al
M
ec
h
an
ic
al
fa
il
u
re
.
D
T
4
D
H
N
O
R
SO
K
M
-6
50
q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
o
f
a.
Pe
rf
o
rm
ed
a
F
E
M
an
al
ys
is
.
in
te
gr
it
y.
W
it
h
st
an
d
Le
ak
ag
e
W
el
d
b
et
w
ee
n
sm
al
l
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t,
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
rs
o
fs
p
ec
ia
lm
at
er
ia
l.
b.
E
va
lu
at
e
th
e
im
p
ac
to
fs
lu
g
in
d
u
ce
d
o
p
er
at
io
n
al
lo
ad
s.
b
o
re
p
ip
es
an
d
h
ea
d
er
H
C
le
ak
ag
e
So
m
e
fi
el
d
h
is
to
ry
to
p
si
d
e.
lo
ad
s
o
n
th
e
in
le
tc
o
o
le
r
u
n
it
.
p
o
ss
ib
le
w
ea
k
p
o
in
ts
..
d
et
ec
ti
o
n
.
Sy
st
em
In
te
gr
at
ed
in
O
rm
en
La
n
ge
P
ilo
t.
V
ib
ra
ti
o
n
is
su
es
6M
o
is
se
le
ct
ed
to
av
o
id
H
IS
C
re
la
te
d
co
n
ce
rn
s.
(b
6)
D
u
ri
n
g
X
X
In
sp
ec
ti
o
n
d
u
r-
n
/a
n
/a
n
/a
a.
E
va
lu
at
e
an
d
ve
ri
fy
w
el
d
s.
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
in
g
co
n
st
ru
c-
b.
X
ti
o
n
.
1.
2.
2
D
is
ch
ar
ge
Se
cu
re
fl
ow
ra
te
N
o
rm
al
C
lo
gg
ed
H
yd
ra
te
fo
rm
at
io
n
D
P
/D
T
an
d
4
B
M
Ve
ry
u
n
li
ke
ly
to
o
cc
u
r
b
ef
o
re
h
yd
ra
te
s
h
av
e
a.
A
ss
es
s
su
ffi
ci
en
ta
m
o
u
n
t/
q
u
al
it
y
(s
al
t
(c
1)
h
ea
d
er
w
it
h
in
ac
ce
p
ta
b
le
li
q
u
id
co
n
te
n
t
cl
o
gg
ed
th
e
co
o
li
n
g
p
ip
es
.
co
n
te
n
tc
o
n
ce
rn
s)
o
fM
E
G
.
li
m
it
s.
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t
O
cc
u
re
s
b
y
la
ck
o
fM
E
G
.
Te
m
p
er
at
u
re
an
d
p
re
ss
u
re
ex
p
ec
te
d
lo
w
er
th
an
in
th
e
in
le
th
ea
d
er
.
(c
2)
Sa
n
d
ac
cu
m
u
la
ti
o
n
D
P
1
C
L
Ve
ry
u
n
li
ke
ly
to
o
cc
u
r,
si
n
ce
th
e
sa
n
d
w
ill
fo
llo
w
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t
th
e
ga
s.
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
tp
ag
e
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Ta
b
le
B
.2
–
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
vi
o
u
s
p
ag
e
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
o
fe
le
m
en
t
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
o
ff
ai
lu
re
R
is
k
ra
n
ki
n
g
E
l-
(F
M
)
ID
E
le
m
en
t
N
am
e
M
ai
n
fu
n
ct
io
n
o
f
el
em
en
t
O
p
er
at
io
n
al
M
o
d
e
Fa
il
u
re
m
o
d
e
Fa
il
u
re
ca
u
se
o
r
m
ec
h
an
is
m
D
et
ec
ti
o
n
o
f
fa
il
u
re
Con
Freq
Crit
C
o
m
m
en
ts
A
ct
io
n
It
em
1.
2.
2
D
is
ch
ar
ge
M
ec
h
an
ic
al
N
o
rm
al
E
xt
er
n
al
M
ec
h
an
ic
al
fa
il
u
re
.
D
P
4
D
H
N
O
R
SO
K
M
-6
50
q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
o
fm
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
rs
o
f
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